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Abstract
Body sensor networks (BSNs) have become a prom-
ising technology for healthcare, in which biosensors 
continuously monitor physiological parameters of a 
user. Distinct from conventional sensor networks for 
environmental monitoring, such networks need to be 
adaptive and can therefore be easily managed. In ad-
dition, security becomes a necessity. To this end, we 
design a policy system that implements policy-driven 
management on the sensor level. Biosensor adaptabil-
ity is realized through support of dynamic loading, 
enabling and disabling of policies without shutting 
down nodes. In addition, fine-grained access control 
becomes possible through authorization policies on 
biosensors. Design and implementation details of the 
policy system are presented. Experimental results 
demonstrate that the policy system is viable and can 
accelerate application development of biosensor net-
works for healthcare. 
1. Introduction
Body sensor networks (BSNs) [1, 2] have recently 
been employed for various personal applications, in 
particular healthcare applications [3]. In a BSN, bio-
medical sensors are attached to, or possibly implanted 
in, patients to monitor physiological parameters con-
tinuously for health management. Abnormal events 
indicating coronary problems such as high heart rate or 
blood pressure can be detected and reported to a doctor 
for immediate medical actions. Such BSNs are particu-
larly suitable for post-operative care in hospitals and 
for treatment of chronically ill or aged patients at 
home.  
There is typically little functional redundancy be-
tween the nodes in a BSN compared to a large-scale 
sensor network, e.g., for environment monitoring 
where most nodes perform similar functions and have 
the same sensors. BSNs exhibit several unique re-
quirements when compared to traditional sensor net-
works. First, sensors in a healthcare BSN often need to 
adapt their behaviours to changes in the patient’s 
medical condition or activity. The sensors should be 
configured accordingly to reflect such changes. For 
example, when a patient is suspected to have a cold, 
the temperature sensors should become more sensitive 
and report more temperature data for better monitor-
ing. In some situations, the doctor may want more de-
tail on blood sugar level of the patient, so glucose sen-
sors which have been turned off for power conserva-
tion must be enabled.  
Second, security is essential for practical use of 
BSNs in healthcare where privacy concerns about ac-
cess to a patient’s health condition data can be impor-
tant. Preventing unauthorised access to actuators, such 
as insulin or other drug pumps, may be even more 
critical as this involves the patient’s safety. However, 
there is a need for different types of medical staff to 
have differentiated privileges with respect to access of 
a patient’s sensors and actuators. There is also the need 
to protect against malicious attackers, particularly for 
celebrities and other high profile patients. Thus, only 
authorized access to biosensors should be permitted, 
for both accessing data and performing actions and 
unauthorized access must be blocked.
Little existing work fulfils the above requirements. 
TinyOS, the de facto standard operating system for 
sensors, does not support dynamic modification of 
code once the program is deployed. Thus, it is difficult 
for a sensor to adapt its behaviour – a typical solution 
is to shut down the network and reprogram the sensors. 
Most network programming protocols [4-6] require the 
whole program code image to be disseminated to the 
sensors through wireless communications. This not 
only incurs large overhead of wireless communication, 
which is the main source of power consumption on 
sensors, but also interrupts the current operation of the 
network. For data confidentiality, symmetric cryptog-
raphy has been used in sensor networks. Key manage-
ment schemes [7-9] ensure that sensors trying to com-
municate with each other share common keys. How-
2008 14th IEEE International Conference on Parallel and Distributed Systems
1521-9097/08 $25.00 © 2008 IEEE
DOI 10.1109/ICPADS.2008.52
383
Authorized licensed use limited to: Philips. Downloaded on February 5, 2009 at 10:55 from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply.
ever, such approaches achieve only data confidentiality 
but do not perform access control on individual nodes.
Policy-driven management has been widely recog-
nized as an important technology for managing dis-
tributed systems [10]. By separating policies from the 
system implementation, a policy-driven system can 
adapt to changes by dynamically changing policies. In 
addition, fine-grained access control can also be real-
ized by making use of authorization policies. We have 
developed a policy-based system [3, 11] for pervasive 
healthcare, which use a PDA as a coordinator that pro-
vides functions, such as discovery of sensors, event 
routing and external remote communication. It uses a 
policy system called Ponder2 [12] which runs on the 
relatively powerful PDA hosting a java virtual ma-
chine environment. Sensors are treated as passive, 
managed objects, polled at regular intervals for read-
ings.  
This paper presents the design, implementation and 
evaluation of Finger, an efficient policy system run-
ning on sensors. This system supports interpretation 
and enforcement of both obligation policies, which are 
event-condition-action rules that perform an action in 
response to an event, and authorisation policies, which 
define what resources or services a subject can access 
on a target sensor. Each sensor manages its own poli-
cies and implements both a Policy Decision Point 
(PDP) and a Policy Enforcement Point (PEP). A PDP 
interprets policies and makes policy decisions. Follow-
ing the decision made by the PDP, the PEP enforces 
the policy, i.e., it invokes the action specified by the 
obligation policy, or permits/denies a subject from 
performing a requested action. In essence, Finger sup-
ports a considerably simplified version of the Ponder2 
language for policy specification [12]. The effective 
simplification makes the policy language suitable for 
processing on resource-constrained sensors. Compact 
design and implementation on TinyOS makes Finger 
efficient and responsive while introducing modest 
overhead of resource consumption.  
Finger is motivated by many successful policy sys-
tems for traditional distributed systems. Policy-based 
management of networks and distributed systems [10] 
has received significant attention. It has been applied 
to security management and privacy preservation [13]. 
Considerable effort has been applied to develop ex-
pressive languages for specifying policies [14-16]. 
Nevertheless, these languages are not suitable for sen-
sor networks due to resource constraints. The policy 
language developed for Finger is a very simplified 
version of Ponder2.  
The paper is structured as follows – Section 2 de-
scribes the background and gives a motivating exam-
ple. In Section 3, we present the architectural design, 
followed by implementation details in Section 4. We 
present experimental results in Section 5, and conclude 
the paper in Section 6.  
2. Background and motivation 
A BSN consists of a controller, biosensors, and 
possibly dynamic nodes. The controller manages the 
whole network and can be a PDA or a Smartphone, 
which is relatively powerful, compared to sensors. 
Biosensors are attached on the body or implanted 
within the body for monitoring various aspects of body 
condition. A biosensor is subject to severe resource 
constraints as it has small memory and limited process-
ing capability. Dynamic nodes represent medics, such 
as nurses and doctors, which may intermittently inter-
act with a patient BSN for short periods to obtain read-
ings or change settings.  
Finger is intended for the hardware platform of bio-
sensor node [17], equipped with a TI MSP430F149 
microcontroller – see Figure 1. This microcontroller 
has a 16-bit RISC processor and works at 16MHz. It 
has 60KB, read-only program memory for executable 
code and 2KB writable data memory serving as a data 
stack. A CR2430 Li-battery is used to power a node. 
The sensing board integrates sensors such as tempera-
ture sensor and accelerometer, which can be connected 
to the processing board. With a radio transceiver of 
Chipcon CC2420, a node communicates with other 
nodes using the IEEE 802.15.4 protocol at 2.4G Hz. 
The maximum communication bandwidth is 250 kbps.  
TinyOS is an operating system designed for re-
source-constrained sensors. A TinyOS application pro-
gram is a graph of software components with well de-
fined bi-directional interfaces. Its event-driven execu-
tion model is effective for energy-efficient design. The 
processor switches to the idle mode when there is no 
task to perform, which consumes significantly reduced 
power compared to the active mode. TinyOS is a very 
simple operating system and is thus suitable for mem-
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Figure 1: A biosensor node consisting of a 
processing board and a pluggable sensing 
board, compared to the size of a ballpoint pen.
384
Authorized licensed use limited to: Philips. Downloaded on February 5, 2009 at 10:55 from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply.
ory-constrained sensors. Complex OS functionalities 
such as dynamic memory allocation are unavailable.  
Consider a healthcare scenario where a BSN is at-
tached to a user for on-body monitoring. In the net-
work, there are a controller, a temperature sensor and 
an accelerometer sensor which can be used to deter-
mine user activity, e.g., walking or sitting. The control-
ler performs important tasks such as data aggregation, 
policy deployment and security management.  
To detect the activity of the user, an accelerometer 
sensor starts a timer and regularly (e.g., every 5 sec-
onds) reads accelerometer data. The timer frequency is 
an important parameter that determines the ability of 
detecting activity changes. A higher frequency allows 
the sensor to detect more rapid movement changes but 
then the sensor consumes more energy. It is intuitive 
that when the acceleration is over a certain threshold, it 
is likely that the user is starting to walk. Thus, a sensor 
should increase its measurement frequency so that 
more acceleration data can be obtained for more accu-
rate estimation. When the acceleration becomes 
smaller than the threshold, it is probable that the user is 
sitting or standing. Thus, the measurement rate can be 
reduced for energy conservation. Two obligation poli-
cies can realize such adaptation. 
oblig on accel_event (acceleration)
(1) do adjust_measurement_interval (1s) 
if acceleration >= 30
oblig on accel_event (acceleration)
(2) do adjust_measurement_interval (5s) 
if acceleration <= 20
The important parameter of the measurement interval 
can be re-configured according to application require-
ments by updating the two policies.  
A doctor may decide that it is useful to study the re-
lation between body temperature and user activity, so 
the temperature sensor should record the body tem-
perature when an activity change occurs. However, 
this function has not been pre-programmed on the sen-
sor. But, this could be achieved by deploying new 
policies. The accelerometer sensor should notify the 
temperature sensor of new activities. Thus, it needs an 
obligation policy for this. 
oblig on new_activity_event(activity)
(3) do raise_event (activity_event, activity)
The temperature sensor accordingly needs an obliga-
tion policy forcing it to record the current body tem-
perature on perception of a new activity. 
oblig on new_activity_event (activity)
(4) do record_temperature 
The accelerometer sensor raises an event on the tem-
perature sensor and this should be subject to authoriza-
tion control. Otherwise, unauthorized nodes may raise 
arbitrary events and do harm to the node. Thus, the 
temperature sensor needs an authorization policy to 
permit the event-raising action for the accelerometer 
sensor.
auth+ subject acceleration_sensor 
(5) target temperature_sensor 
action raise_event 
The controller often needs to re-configure the sensor 
network by changing policies on sensors. Policy man-
agement tasks include loading, unloading, enabling 
and disabling policies. Thus, the accelerometer sensor 
should have an authorization policy to allow the con-
troller to change its policies.  
auth+ subject controller 
(6) target acceleration_sensor
action manage_policy 
The temperature sensor should also have a similar au-
thorization policy.  
auth+ subject controller 
(7) target temperature_node
action manage_policy 
This example demonstrates that sensors must fre-
quently adapt to both context changes and application 
requirements. They also need to cooperate with each 
other to achieve application goals. Obligation and au-
thorization policies provide a flexible and easily modi-
fied means of specifying what interactions must be 
performed and what interactions are permitted.  
3. Design of Finger 
Several challenges exist in implementing a policy 
system on small sensors. It is crucial to make efficient 
use of the limited resources such as small memory. 
Policy based systems such as Ponder2, or XACML are 
inappropriate for resource-constrained sensors. It is 
impractical to pre-load all required policies so dynamic 
management of policies with each node responsible for 
maintaining and managing its own policies is required, 
i.e., it must be possible to load, unload, enable and 
disable policies but at the same time protect these im-
portant operations from unauthorised access. The fol-
lowing design objectives were considered important in 
the implementation of Finger:  
? Dynamic management of policies. When a node 
is discovered and joins a network the policies ap-
propriate to its role within the network must be 
dynamically loaded [3] and possibly modified at a 
later time to enable context adaptation. The policy 
system should support such dynamic management 
of policies.
? Efficient resource usage. The memory used by 
the policy system must be kept to a minimum, as 
it should be conserved for application codes.
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? Responsiveness. Policy software should intro-
duce minimal processing latency, as some appli-
cations may require critical response times. 
? Programming interfaces. Clear and easy-to-use 
APIs are needed to enable rapid development of 
new policy-based applications for healthcare. 
3.1. System overview 
The architectural overview of Finger is depicted in 
Figure 2. The core of Finger comprises two compo-
nents, i.e., the Obligation Interpreter (OI) and the Au-
thorization Interpreter (AI) for interpreting and enforc-
ing obligation policies and authorization policies, re-
spectively. Both the OI and the AI provide a repository 
for storing policies but the dynamic management of 
stored policies is implemented in an independent com-
ponent that provides policy management actions. By 
this means, requests to managing policies on a sensor 
can be governed by authentication and authorisation 
checks as normal requests.  
The OI receives events generated from the internal 
TinyOS components controlling sensors, e.g., tempera-
ture sensors, as well as external events received as in-
coming messages from the network. It can perform 
actions on software or hardware components within 
the node. An action on a software component could 
generate an event or message to be sent out to the net-
work. On receiving an event, the OI searches the pol-
icy repository for all policies matching the event type. 
It then checks if the condition of the corresponding 
obligation policy evaluates to true and if so, the OI 
invokes the specified action through the Action inter-
face.
All incoming requests from external nodes are 
checked for authentication and authorisation. Incoming 
requests could be either an incoming event or a request 
to perform an action on a hardware or software com-
ponent, including policy management operations. In-
coming requests are of the form <subject, action, # of 
paras, paras>. The Request Manager (RM) receives 
incoming requests and authenticates the requesting 
subject by invoking the Authentication Manager (AM). 
This module is discussed in the next subsection.  
If the subject is authenticated, the request is passed 
to the AI via the ProcessRequest interface. The AI then 
searches its authorization policies. If a policy for the 
subject and the requested action is found, the associ-
ated condition is checked and if positive, the associ-
ated action is then invoked. For incoming, authorized 
events, the associated action is treated as raising an 
event. The first parameter of the request indicates the 
event type and the second one indicates the event 
value. The AI invokes, through the RaiseExternalEvents
interface, the ExternalEventsM component, which im-
mediately triggers the OI.  
As previously discussed, the code size must be 
minimized. We find that the OI and the AI share much 
Figure 2. The architectural overview of Finger. Components of Finger are connected by interfaces 
that define commands and events. The gray end of an interface provides commands and fire 
events, while the white end uses commands and handle events.
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in common. In particular, they both evaluate con-
straints. Thus, we factor out the implementation of 
condition evaluator and make it as an independent 
component. By this means, only one copy of code is 
needed for both the OI and the AI.
3.2. Authentication design 
The target node must authenticate the requesting 
node before making the authorization decision. The 
requesting node presents the target node the informa-
tion of <ID, role>. The AM must decide whether the 
requester really possesses the ID and whether it has the 
claimed role. In Figure 3, a simple example is illus-
trated. The example BSN consists of a controller and 
four sensors. Sensor 3 sends a request to sensor 4 and 
sensor 4 wants to authenticate sensor 3.  
We have developed an efficient authentication pro-
tocol based on the Diffie-Hellman (DH) key agree-
ment. Both public-key and symmetric cryptography are 
employed. In the initialization phase, each sensor i
generates a secret si, and computes a keyshare pi based 
on its secret, isip g? . It is computationally infeasible 
to recover the secret, given the keyshare. The sensor 
obtains the group key from the controller, and ex-
changes its keyshare with the controller. The channel 
by which the group key is obtained and the keyshares 
are exchanged is physically secure, e.g., by plugging it 
into the controller’s USB port.  
The controller creates and maintains a membership 
list of node ID, role and keyshare. Table 1 shows the 
content of the table for the example. Using the group 
key, the controller can periodically publish the mem-
bership to all members in the network whenever there 
are changes in the membership. The controller en-
crypts the membership list only once for each release 
and this only incurs a single broadcast transmission. 
All the sensors in the network can decrypt the mem-
bership list using the group key. However, this is based 
on the assumption that nodes which have been admit-
ted into the network do not behave maliciously by 
spoofing the membership list.  
With the membership list, a pair of sensors i and j
can then establish a pairwise shared key Kij. Sensor i
computes the shared key as follows,  
? ? ? ? ii j i jss s s sij jK p g g? ? ? . (1)
Sensor j can compute Kij in a similar way. The group 
key is renewed whenever a member is detected to have 
left the network or been compromised, or when it has 
been used for an extended period of time. When re-
newing the group key, the controller sends the new 
group key to every member individually. The new key 
is encrypted using the shared key.
With the pairwise shared key, we develop a chal-
lenge-response exchange procedure for a sensor to 
authenticate a requesting node. Consider the scenario 
in the example that sensor 4 wants to authenticate sen-
sor 3. The process is initiated by sensor 3 sending a 
request to sensor 4. Sensor 4 can compute the pairwise 
shared key K43 according to (1). Sensor 4 then chal-
lenges sensor 3 by sending its nonce encrypted with 
the shared key K34. Sensor 3 should decrypt the en-
crypted nonce and respond with a (nonce +1) en-
crypted with the shared key. Sensor 4 authenticates 
sensor 3 if the response content is indeed (nonce + 1).
The three-way handshake is costly since it intro-
duces two additional communications. This not only 
wastes power but also introduces overall latency for 
request processing. We propose a ticket technique to 
avoid three-way handshake each time a request is proc-
essed. After the authentication is passed successfully, 
sensor 4 creates a ticket which is essentially a random 
number and sends it to sensor 3. Later, each time sen-
sor 3 requests an action on sensor 4, it increases the 
ticket by one and appends it to the request. Sensor 4 
decrypts the request. If the ticket is indeed the ticket 
plus one, it is able to ensure that the requesting node is 
sensors 3. Such a ticket is renewed, through the target 
initiating a new challenge-response procedure, after it 
has been used for an exceeded period.
Table 1: Membership List
Node ID Role Keyshare 
0 controller g^s0
1 ra g^s1
2 rb g^s2
3 rb g^s3
4 rc g^s4
? ?00 0, ss p g?
? ?22 2, ss p g?
? ?44 4, ss p g?? ?22 2, ss p g?
? ?11 1, ss p g?
3 4s sg
? ?
34
3,4, Krequest
? ?
34
34,3, Knonce
? ?
34
33,4, 1 Knonce ?
Figure 3: Diffie-Hellman based key establish-
ment, and three-way handshake authentica-
tion procedure
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4. Implementation details 
Policy Specification. We have to scale down the 
complexity of policies since small sensors cannot af-
ford to process complex policies used in traditional 
distributed systems. We designed a simple and effi-
cient policy language with a syntax suitable for effi-
cient processing by biosensors yet it is expressive and 
able to fulfil most management needs of sensor net-
works. The syntax of policies is specified in Table 2. 
An obligation policy specifies the event, the action and 
the condition under which this action must be per-
formed. Note that an action is also associated with sev-
eral parameters to be used when this action is invoked. 
An authorization policy defines the subject, the target, 
the action and the condition. A subject or target is a 
role in a domain hierarchy. Details of how nodes are 
discovered and assigned to roles are described in [4]. 
The policies used in the motivating example can be 
specified as shown in Table 3. For policy (1) the first 
“0” indicates it is an obligation policy and “#1” is its 
ID. The obligation-triggering event “1?” refers to the 
acceleration event. The condition ? 30 refers to the 
acceleration context variable “1^”. The obligation has 
an action of “1” to adjust measurement interval and the 
action takes a parameter of “1”. 
Memory Organization. It is of great importance to 
manage the limited memory of a sensor. Since TinyOS 
does not support dynamic memory allocation, we need 
to allocate space to hold the maximum number of poli-
cies statically. For each type of policy, we maintain 
two lists: one for the available policies and the other 
for vacant cells. Each time a policy is loaded, a vacant 
cell is obtained from the vacant list and inserted into 
the available list. Conversely, when an existing policy 
is removed, its cell is recycled back to the vacant list.  
It is difficult to predict the maximum number of poli-
cies that a sensor will need. However as the resources 
are limited we assume this is likely to be in the order 
of 10-40. Our approach is to estimate the number of 
policies needed for the current application and allow 
for twice that number for future adaptivity. 
Dynamic Policy Management. Dynamic manage-
ment of policies is crucial to the adaptation ability of 
sensors. As discussed, management operations are 
treated as regular authorization requests and are con-
trolled by authorization policies. Authorized manage-
ment requests result in performing an action on the 
ManagePoliciesActionM component. The ManagePolicie-
sActionM implements all policy management operations 
and provides the Action interface to the AI. The first 
parameter of the action is used to indicate the type of 
policy management, i.e., loading, unloading, enabling 
or disabling. For loading a policy, the second parame-
ter is a string containing the policy text. For the other 
three types, the second parameter indicates the ID of 
the policy to be operated. To load a policy, the man-
agement component parses the policy text by invoking 
the PolicyTextParser component. Through the PolicyCon-
trol interface, the resultant parsed policy is passed to 
the AI or the OI, and then inserted into the available 
policies. The two types of enabling and disabling add 
flexibility but reduce communication cost.  
Authentication Manager. To overcome the heavy 
cost of exponential computation in the traditional DH 
key agreement protocol, we exploit the Elliptic Curve 
Cryptography (EEC) to implement the authentication 
protocol. ECC public-key cryptography has much 
shorter key length and less computation overhead than 
RSA. We slightly modified the TinyECC [18] package 
to migrate it to the platform of biosensor node. We 
implemented the authentication protocol using point 
multiplication in ECC. First, a base point is chosen and 
made publicly known to all sensors. Next, each sensor 
i generates a random point as its secret si. The keyshare 
pi of sensor i is computed by multiplying secret si with 
the base point G, pi=siG. To compute the pairwise 
shared key with of sensor i, sensor j multiplies its own 
Table 2: Language syntax summary
policy: 
    obligation_policy 
    authorization_policy 
obligation_policy : 
type # pid & eid ? condition ~ action
authorization_policy: 
type # pid & sid @ tid ? condition ~ action
condition: 
contextId ^ comparator value
contextId ^ range_condition 
always
comparator: one of 
>= <= == !=
range_condition:
[ value , value ]
action:
actionId
actionId (paras)
paras:
para, paras
Table 3: Policy texts used in the example
“0 # 1 & 1 ? 1^ >=30 ~ 1 (1)” (1) 
“0 # 2 & 1 ? 1^ <=20 ~ 1 (5)” (2) 
“0 # 3 & 2 ? always ~ 2 ()” (3) 
“0 # 4 & 2 ? always ~ 3 ()” (4) 
“1 # 5 & 1 @ 2 ? always ~ 4” (5) 
“1 # 6 & 0 @ 1 ? always ~ 5” (6) 
“1 # 7 & 0 @ 2 ? always ~ 5” (7) 
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secret with the keyshare of sensor i, Kji = sj(pi) = sjsiG.
In a similar way, sensor i can compute the shared key 
with j, Kij = si(pj) = sisjG = Kji. Although a point on an 
elliptic curve is two dimensional and represented by (x,
y), only the x value is used to generate the shared key. 
The x value is hashed to produce a 160-bit key as the 
pairwise shared symmetric key. We adopted Skipjack, 
implemented in TinySec [19], for symmetric encryp-
tion with a 160 bit key length. Skipjack is a block-
cipher with the block size of 8 bytes. We use the Ci-
pher Block Chaining (CBC) operation mode with non-
repeating Initialisation Vector (IV). The battery level 
or sensor readings can be used as the seed of a pseudo-
random number generator to generate the initial IV. 
Programming Interfaces. Finger provides simple 
application programming interfaces (APIs) to applica-
tion developers. The components of Finger are pack-
aged as a single TinyOS configuration component, 
called FingerC, which hides the implementation details 
of Finger from developers. Three TinyOS interfaces 
are exposed as shown in Figure 4. To use policies Fin-
gerC should be included in the application configura-
tion. The Main module of the application wires its 
StdControl to that of the policy system, which initializes 
the embedded components with Finger. To extend the 
functionality, application-specific event sources and 
actions can be developed. Event sources connect to the 
EventSource interface to trigger obligation policies. 
Similarly, all actions to be regulated by authorization 
policies should connect to the Action interface.
5. Experiment results 
To facilitate performance measurements, we devel-
oped a simple TinyOS application SimApp making use 
of Finger. This application implements an event source 
of acceleration, and two actions which toggle the red 
light and the green light, respectively. An obligation 
policy is deployed for this event, which specifies that 
the green light be toggled when the acceleration is lar-
ger than a threshold. It also has an authorization policy 
which controls accesses to the red light action.
We investigate memory overhead solely introduced 
by Finger. More specifically, we look at the ROM and 
RAM sizes. The ROM stores the program executable 
and the RAM servers as the run-time data stack. Nev-
ertheless, it is difficult to compute the binary code size 
of Finger precisely since in TinyOS we only have ac-
cess to the aggregate code size of an entire application. 
We need to separate the Finger’s code from basic 
TinyOS and communication components.  
The ECC and TinySec libraries require considerable 
memory. In order to evaluate the core policy system, 
which solely interprets and enforces obligation and 
authorization policies, we used two versions of the 
policy system, Finger(w) and Finger(w/o) – with and 
without authentication, respectively.  
All optimization switches of TinyECC were turned 
on for minimization of processing latency. However, 
some of the switches can be turned off to trade mem-
ory consumption for cryptography performance. Note 
that, a biosensor node has only 2K bytes RAM so can-
not host Finger(w), so we had to use a Tmote Sky node 
instead for experiments with Finger(w). A Tmote node 
shares the same processor with a biosensor, but it has a 
larger RAM size (with 10K bytes). The resultant mem-
ory size of Finger is dependent on the maximum num-
ber of policies deployed. All the following measure-
ments are based on a maximum number of 20 policies.  
We compiled SimApp into TinyOS executable on 
the biosensor node platform. The executable without 
authentication occupies 15.62K bytes of ROM and 
1.06K bytes of RAM, and the one with authentication 
occupies 31.28K bytes of ROM and 2.88K bytes of 
RAM. Table 4 shows the code size breakdown of Si-
mApp, where ROM and RAM are shown separately. 
From this breakdown, we can calculate that the authen-
tication module using TinyECC takes 15.66K bytes of 
ROM and 1.82K bytes of RAM.  
We examine various processing delays introduced 
by the policy system. The experiments were conducted 
with 7 obligation policies and 8 authorization policies. 
The delays of processing obligations and authoriza-
tions are shown in Table 5. The obligation interpreta-
tion delay is measured from the time the OI is trig-
gered by an event source to the time the OI invokes the 
corresponding action. The authorization interpretation 
delay is from the time when the RM passes an incom-
ing request to the AI to the time when the AI invokes 
the associated action. It takes as little as 62 μs to proc-
ess an obligation policy and 81 μs to process an au-
thorization policy. We also measured the latency of 
raising an external event on a sensor. The whole proc-
ess includes processing an authorization policy and 
then an obligation policy. The latency is 140 μs. We 
StdControl
EventSource
Provided 
Interface
Used 
Interface
FingerC
Actioni
i
Figure 4: Programming interfaces of Finger. 
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also measured the latency caused by policy manage-
ment. It takes 375 μs to load an authorization policy.  
We also evaluated delays for various cryptographic 
operations in the authentication process. It takes on 
average 9530 ms to encrypt a 52-byte message, whose 
content are randomly generated, and 5281 ms to de-
crypt the encrypted message. With the Skipjack li-
brary, it takes significantly less time, 150 μs to encrypt 
the same message and 90 μs to decrypt the encrypted 
message. This big difference shows that it is essential 
to use shared keys for most encryption. Based on the 
shared key, the authentication can be more efficiently 
performed using the symmetric Skipjack cryptography. 
These delays are acceptable since it is rarely used since 
the ticket technique is used.  
6. Conclusions
We have presented an efficient policy system for 
body sensor networks. Finger supports efficient sen-
sor-level interpretation and enforcement of both obli-
gation and authorization policies. It realizes policy-
based adaptation to changes in context or application 
requirements without interrupting the current network 
operation. Fine-grained access control is also enabled 
such that sensitive data or operations can be protected 
against unauthorized access. Performance measure-
ments of Finger indicate that it is viable and practical 
for biosensors. With Finger, application development 
can also be accelerated since developers only need to 
focus on developing event sources and actions, and 
composing policies.  
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Table 4: Code size breakdown of SimApp 
Component ROM (KB) RAM (KB) 
Finger (w) 20.65 2.35 
Finger (w/o) 4.99 0.53 
Comm. 8.08 0.49 
Basics 2.55 0.04 
Total (w/o) 15.62 1.06 
Total (w) 31.28 2.88 
Table 5: Processing delays 
Operation Delay  
Obligation Interp.  62 μs
Authorization Interp. 81 μs
Public Encrypt. 9530 ms 
Public Decrypt. 5281 ms 
Symmetric Encrypt. 150 μs
Symmetric Decrypt. 90 μs
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